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Introduction  
The Stirling Media Research Institute has been engaged 
in an ongoing programme of research into the public 
relations and lobbying industry in Scotland, the UK and 
Europe since 1996 . We have been encouraged by the 
Standards Committee's recognition of the importance of 
lobbying as a matter of both professional and public 
concern, and we welcome the opportunity to respond to 
the consultation paper. Our contribution is offered in the 
spirit of independent academic analysis.  
We have monitored the growth and development of the 
lobbying industry in Scotland and interviewed a wide 
range of lobbyists and public relations professionals 
ranging across the commercial (consultancy and in-
house) and voluntary sectors. As part of our research 
activity, the SMRI has been a corporate member of 
ASPA since its inception. When we joined, it was made 
clear we were researchers and not in any way engaged in 
professional lobbying. Our research at the UK and 
European levels has also brought us into contact with 
commercial and voluntary sector lobbyists who work in 
other jurisdictions, and has broadened our perspective on 
the issues relating to lobbying.  
What is a Lobbyist?  
We accept that a wide variety of organisations engage in 
lobbying. But it is hardly a serious argument to say, as 
lobbyists sometimes do, that lobbying consultancies have 
nothing to do with lobbying. This is because many 
lobbyists are extremely keen not to describe themselves 
as lobbyists. They use all sorts of euphemisms such as 
'political consultants', 'advocates', 'public affairs 
advisers', 'government relations counsel' etc. Whatever 
label they use, and however much they claim to help the 
democratic process by enabling dialogue and mutual 
understanding, it remains the case that they work for 
clients who hire them to pursue their own sectional 
interests.  
We certainly accept that all organisations have a 
democratic right to lobby their MSPs and the Executive 
and that all organisations have a right to employ 
professional advisers. It is, however, fanciful to pretend 
(as some lobbyists do) that the ability to employ advisers 
is not systematically limited by resources. In fact 
lobbying consultancies overwhelmingly work for 
business interests, who also provide by far the largest 
proportion of their income.  
The Lobbying Industry  
It is worth noting that many of the bigger lobbying and 
public relations consultancies currently active in 
Scotland are themselves owned by large multinational 
communication conglomerates.  
For example, most APPC Scotland member agencies 
have offices both in Brussels and London, and are 
affiliated to, or owned by, communications 
conglomerates with a global reach. Scotland is merely a 
local outpost of the global communications economy. Of 
the eight lobbying companies with offices in Scotland 
who are members of the APPC, six are owned by 
multinational communication conglomerates with global 
reach:  
Strategy in Scotland (part of Westminster Strategy, in 
turn part of the international Grayling group, owned by 
the Lopex communication corporation);  
Shandwick (the Scottish branch of the Interpublic 
communication conglomerate);  
GPC Scotland (part of the global GPC network, owned 
by the Omnicom group, which has other interests in 
Scotland through Countrywide Porter Novelli, who are 
members of ASPA);  
Citigate Public Affairs (a branch of Citigate Dewe 
Rogerson, owned by the communications corporation 
Incepta);  
GJW Scotland (the Scottish office of GJW Government 
Relations, recently acquired by BSMG Worldwide);  
APCO Scotland (part of APCO Worldwide).  
These corporations have their own interests across the 
media and communication industries. One of the key 
concerns for the future is the extent to which their 
activities in differing branches of the communication 
industries might involve a conflict of interest. This issue 
has not yet been of public concern in Scotland. But at the 
UK and global levels communications conglomerates 
increasingly promote the sectional interests of their 
clients through lobbying and public relations activities 
while also owning news organisations which are 
supposed to report dispassionately on the same clients. 
For example ITN and the PR giant Burson Marsteller 
jointly own Corporate Television News which makes 
corporate videos and video news releases. There have 
recently been allegations that the priorities of CTNÕs 
clients can affect ITN reporting of public issues such as 
the role of Shell in Nigeria, Shell being a CTN client 
(Monbiot 1998; Whitehead 1998). Whether these 
particular allegations have substance or not, the issue of a 
potential conflict of interest is clear. As things stand in 
Scotland there are a number of prominent broadcast 
journalists who both work for organisations which 
provide media training to large Scottish and 
multinational corporations and who are also expected to 
dispassionately report the activities of those corporations.  
Such potential conflicts of interest are currently not 
widely known or aired in Scotland and are likely to 
remain hidden in the absence of statutory regulation 
which would require the disclosure of clients and fees by 
both PR and lobbying consultancies. 
Lobbying trade associations  
Lobbying trade associations exist largely in order to 
defend the sectional interests of their industries. Both of 
the dedicated lobbying trade organisations in the UK 
(APPC, ASPA) have come into existence in the last six 
years as a result of journalistic exposure of alleged 
lobbying malpractice. One of their main aims in practice 
is to resist proper democratic scrutiny of their activities. 
To this end they will attempt to portray lobbying as a 
harmless or democratically helpful activity or claim that 
they represent a wide range of opinion and interests and 
not simply those which are narrowly corporate. Both 
ASPA and the APPC engage in the former and ASPA in 
the latter. It is true that ASPA does have members who 
are not from corporations or consultancies, but these are 
very much junior partners in the enterprise. ASPA 
currently has around 25 paid-up members. Of these, 
around two-thirds are from corporate or consultancy 
backgrounds. In essence the trade associations (and the 
wider PR associations such as the IPR and PRCA) are 
self-interested actors in this debate.  
The case for regulation  
At present the system of regulation in Scotland is very 
similar to that of Westminster. The rhetoric of an open 
Scotland distinct from Westminster has not so far been 
achieved in practice. Statutory regulation of lobbying in 
Scotland would be a significant departure from the 
practice at Westminster and could provide a model to be 
followed in London.  
The Standards Committee has already devised a code of 
conduct governing the actions of MSPs. This was a 
welcome first step in providing for probity in Scottish 
public life. However, it is our view that only statutory 
regulation of all lobbyists in Scotland would guarantee 
the highest standards of behaviour of all those involved 
in the political process. Moreover, it could provide the 
public with important information about the political 
process and increase public confidence in the Parliament 
as an institution.  
Objections to a statutory register of outside interests tend 
to focus on the difficulty in defining lobbyists and the 
impracticality of maintaining a register of outside 
interests. There is in fact much evidence to suggest that 
these objections are misplaced. If a statutory register of 
lobbyists includes all those who lobby then the difficulty 
of distinguishing between different types of lobbyists 
(commercial consultants, in-house corporate, voluntary 
sector) becomes less problematic. Many states in the US 
have managed to produce systems of registration which 
can cope with the variety of outside interests who seek to 
shape public policy .  
There is also evidence that these systems are practicable 
and, according to evidence to the Neill Committee, that 
they can make important information available to the 
public Ôcheaply and effectively by electronic 
information gathering, storage and retrieval, providing 
easy access to all who wish itÕ (Neill Committee 2000: 
86). Contemporary experience from the State of New 
York (which has recently enacted, and implemented, the 
New York State Lobbying Act 1999) suggests this. It is 
inaccurate to claim that all statutory regulation is 
cumbersome and ineffective.  
Statutory regulation can work and would help to improve 
the transparency of governance and accessibility of the 
Parliament. But statutory regulation is not a panacea for 
all the ills of democracy in Scotland. It is only the first 
step in ensuring sound standards in Scottish public life. 
Our research suggests that there is a need to make 
significant reforms of the whole culture of governance, 
especially in a small country like Scotland where 
personal networks can be so important (as was 
highlighted during ÔLobbygateÕ). Statutory regulation 
could be conceived as the beginnings of a rolling 
programme of reform of the culture of secrecy which 
affects both lobbying and the civil service in Scotland.  
In the US, corporations have tried to by-pass statutory 
regulation by setting up Ôcitizens groupsÕ which do not 
have to be registered, or by supplying ÔfreeÕ 
entertainment and leisure opportunities (Silverstein 1998: 
221-227). This suggests the need for all lobbyists to be 
covered by a statutory register if they repeatedly contact 
MSPs or officials a significant number of times a year. In 
addition, there is the question of fundraising dinners and 
other events organised by political parties which are 
attended by significant numbers of lobbyists and their 
clients and of donations to political parties. All of these 
lobbying activities should be public, transparent and, 
above all disclosed in a central register.  
The targets of lobbying: Parliament and Executive  
We note that the consultation paper mentions lobbying 
only in relation to Parliament. The survey carried out by 
the Committee was of MSPs only. The Parliament 
certainly is a target for commercial and other lobbyists, 
but lobbying takes place anywhere that public policy is 
made. In Scotland, lobbyists predominantly target the 
Executive.  
It is many years now since MPs in Westminster were the 
major targets of lobbying activity. The cash for questions 
case in 1994 did show that lobbyists still target MPs 
(Leigh and Vulliamy 1997). But more important is the 
targeting of ministers and civil servants by lobbyists and 
their clients. This to some extent lay behind the cash-for-
questions affair as some of it took place when Neil 
Hamilton was a government minister. Access specifically 
to ministers (and not MPs or MSPs) was also central to 
both the ÔDrapergateÕ and ÔlobbygateÕ scandals.  
It is crucial, therefore, that the deliberations of the 
Committee take the lobbying of ministers and civil 
servants into account in considering regulation. It may be 
argued that this is beyond the remit of the Committee. 
We would point however, to the Neill Committee and its 
recommendation that a clear written record of all 
contacts with outside interests be kept by government 
departments:  
We do not think that compliance with a new requirement 
to the record would be burdensome for departments, and 
we believe that it would encourage high and uniform 
standards. (Neill 2000: 91)  
Of course, such a record would have to be regularly and 
publicly reported for it to be of any use in promoting 
transparency or accountability. The key point for us, then 
is that for any system of regulation to work it would have 
to apply to MSPs, ministers and their staff (i.e. civil 
servants, including those in public bodies, quangos, 
NDPBs, nationalised industries and the like.) It should 
also apply even where there may be some current or 
future exemption under Freedom of Information practice 
or legislation (Scottish Executive 1999). The blanket 
exemption in the Freedom of Information consultation 
document for commercial confidentiality, should have no 
place in obscuring the use of lobbying, public relations, 
ÔhospitalityÕ and other gifts in kind. This is particularly 
the case where corporations or others stand to gain 
significantly from contracts with Parliament or the 
Executive or in bidding for PPP/PFI projects and the like.  
It would be rather ironic if the Parliament, born from a 
commitment to open up decision making, were to 
endorse a system of regulation which was less open than 
that in London. Our recommendation would be that 
ministers and civil servants be required to keep a record 
of meetings or other significant contacts with lobbyists, 
their clients and other special interests in line with the 
recommendations of the Neill Committee. This record 
should be put into the public domain at regular intervals 
Ð perhaps once every parliamentary session.  
The role of the public in public consultations  
We recognise the Standards CommitteeÕs genuine 
interest in public consultation on the regulation of 
lobbying. We also note the concern to ascertain whether 
the public finds it easy to access the Parliament. But we 
also note that this consultation has not been very 
extensively promoted to the public. The consultation 
document is available on the Parliament website, but a 
copy of the document was sent out to only 35 
organisations. It is unlikely, therefore, that the public will 
have much genuine opportunity to participate in this 
debate. While we accept that a fair range of non-
governmental and non-corporate organisations have been 
consulted (although the percentage representing 
corporate interests is rather high at 20%), it is not clear 
how the public interest might have any obvious role in 
this consultation. All those that have been asked to 
respond to the consultation are groups who will have a 
particular interest in the rules governing lobbying. To the 
extent that there is a crisis of confidence in governance in 
Scotland, this consultation will do little to counteract that 
problem. There are a number of ways in which public 
views can be taken account of. From opinion polls and 
focus group research to new initiatives in public 
consultation such as that adopted by the Petitions 
Committee, there are ways and means of tapping into and 
responding to public concern.  
It is important that the Standards Committee is not 
unduly swayed by the weight of evidence, but rather its 
quality. A Neill Committee insider revealed to us that 
this was a problem with their recent review of lobbying 
at Westminster (Neill 2000). As most of the evidence 
was provided by political insiders and actors with vested 
interests in the outcome of the review, it became difficult 
to sustain detached public interest arguments. We would 
recommend that the Committee take public concerns 
seriously by attempting to find out what they are and 
then acting upon them.  
We Recommend:  
Statutory regulation of all those engaged in lobbying in 
Scotland;  
Disclosure of resources expended in lobbying 
campaigns, which itemises expenditure by outside 
interests (clients and their agents) on each piece of 
legislation they have lobbied on;  
The publication and dissemination of information in the 
register of lobbyists, including details of all significant 
contacts with Ministers, MSPs and officials;  
The adoption of an electronic system of registration, 
which would facilitate data gathering, storage, retrieval 
and access to information held in the register of 
lobbyists.  
Responses to questions in Annex A of the consultation 
document  
SECTION 1 Ð Lobbying Activity  
1.1 The Stirling Media Research Institute (SMRI) has 
been studying the lobbying industry in Scotland, the UK 
and Europe since 1996. Strictly as part of this research 
the SMRI has been a corporate member of the 
Association for Scottish Public Affairs (ASPA) since its 
inception in 1998. One of our members, William Dinan, 
has been a committee member of ASPA for the last year. 
Our submission to the Committee reflects our knowledge 
of and research on the lobbying industry. It does not 
express the views of ASPA or any other section of the 
lobbying industry.  
SECTION 2 Ð Accessing the Parliament  
2.7 Our research suggests that the rules and procedures 
that govern the Parliament are indeed well understood by 
professional lobbyists. However, our research has also 
brought us into contact with other civic groups and 
members of the public who are interested in accessing 
the Parliament. For these non-professionals the 
Parliament and the Executive are often not seen as open, 
accessible or transparent. This, we believe, seriously 
undermines the CSGÕs optimism that Ôthe open nature 
of the Scottish Parliament would hopefully encourage 
individuals and groups to approach MSPs directly, 
therefore, to some extent, making the need for specialist 
lobbying organisations redundantÕ . While we agree that 
the individual constituent has as much right as the 
professional lobbyist to make representations to the 
Parliament (and Executive), we must recognise that such 
individuals simply donÕt have the necessary resources 
(time, money, and experience) to lobby in the same way 
as professional lobbyists. Statutory regulation will not 
create a two-tier lobbying system, as this already exists 
and is firmly in place in Holyrood. One way to tackle this 
imbalance, in our view, is to open up the activities of 
lobbyists to public scrutiny. In New York one 
consequence of engaging in statutory regulation of 
lobbyists was the production of a guide to lobbying for 
citizens and citizens groups, thus attempting to use 
statutory regulation as a real catalyst for opening up and 
broadening access to law-makers. We recommend an 
approach which sees statutory regulation as the 
beginning of a process which will help to reinvigorate 
democracy to the extent that it widens participation and 
demystifies commercial lobbying activity. Furthermore, 
the fact that the lobbying industry itself is not in favour 
of statutory regulation indicates they do not believe that 
any special advantage might be gained by this. The 
industry is keen on ÔvoluntaryÕ codes precisely because 
they will not have to disclose information about their 
clients, fees and tactics, which is in the public interest.  
SECTION 3 Ð Regulation of Lobbyists and Code of 
Conduct Statutory Regulation  
3.1 Yes. We would strongly support the establishment of 
a statutory registration scheme for professional lobbyists.  
3.2 The main benefit of introducing statutory regulation 
of lobbyists in Scotland would be to ensure that 
Parliament takes distinctive action to police lobbying 
which is in advance of the systems operated in both 
Westminster and Brussels. This would be extremely 
significant evidence that the Parliament was attempting 
to live up to the CSGÕs provisions on openness. A 
statutory register would provide a public record of the 
resources devoted by outside interests to shaping public 
policy in Scotland. At present, the principles of openness 
and transparency that the Scottish Parliament has been 
founded upon lack concrete form. A register of lobbyists 
and their clients would be a very effective way of 
auditing the activities of outside interests who seek to 
influence policy making. One of the recurrent problems 
in trying to understand the nature and scope of lobbying 
activity has been the absence of any reliable data on what 
lobbyists actually do, and what resources are devoted to 
influencing policy. This kind of information will not be 
disclosed by lobbyists unless Parliament requires it. A 
statutory register of lobbyists would allow such 
important information to enter the public domain.  
3.3 The drawbacks of statutory regulation are, in our 
opinion, more imagined than real. There is evidence from 
the United States and Canada that registration systems 
can be administered easily and efficiently, especially in 
electronic form, which has the advantage of being 
relatively cheap and accessible. The only drawback we 
can see is that it would threaten the unaccountable, 
opaque and secretive conduct of some lobbyists. The 
main arguments used against the existing systems of 
regulation by lobbyists tend to be that they do not work 
and are complicated and subject to loopholes. But in fact 
these systems have secured a measure of transparency. 
There certainly is a concern in some places (such as the 
US) that the systems of regulation in place are subject to 
loopholes and that corporations and lobbyists have found 
ways to get round them (Silverstein 1998). In our view 
this is only an argument for having more, not less, 
effective regulation. 
3.4 For a statutory registration scheme to have the full 
confidence of the public, the Parliament, and the 
lobbying community, it should be administered by an 
independent commissioner or commission. Given the 
scale of lobbying in Scotland, such a body could 
probably operate on a part-time basis, with the 
administrative support of Parliamentary staff.  
Voluntary Code  
3.5 As a corporate member of ASPA, the SMRI is 
affiliated to ASPA's code of conduct. However, since we 
do not engage in any lobbying activities, its provisions 
have never actively applied to us.  
3.6 The creation of the ASPA code of conduct was seen 
by some in the organisation as a way of establishing self-
regulation as the norm for Scotland, and as a way of 
seeing off statutory regulation.  
3.7 Based on our research, it would appear that ASPA's 
voluntary code (and indeed that of the APPC) is not 
being monitored in any systematic way, and that 
enforcement is also problematic in principle. In fact, it 
would appear that these voluntary codes are only policed 
sporadically and informally. During our research, we 
were told of a case where professional lobbyists were 
offering preferential access to ministers. These self-same 
lobbyists were signatories to a code which explicitly 
prohibited such behaviour. That this event happened only 
a short while after the ÔLobbygateÕ affair serves to 
highlight the inadequacies of self-regulation on the part 
of lobbyists. It is hardly likely to inspire public 
confidence in the Parliament if the regulation and 
policing of lobbying is left to the industry itself, or 
industry appointed agents. An arrangement whereby 
lobbyists are able to sit in judgement on themselves 
ought to give rise to questions about conflict of interest. 
Furthermore, there remain real legal doubts over the 
ability of lobbyist trade associations to enforce sanctions 
by the application of their codes. In particular there may 
be legal difficulties for ASPA or APPC Scotland in 
Ônaming and shamingÕ lobbyists in member companies. 
It has been suggested to us by lobbyists in London, that 
lobbying companies which have members named and 
shamed might well resort to or threaten to resort to law if 
their business is adversely affected by a trade association 
judgement. Such pressures are not conducive to self-
regulation.  
3.8 The advantage of voluntary codes has been that they 
have given lobbyists guidance on how they should 
behave when in contact with MSPs and their staff. 
However, as these codes are voluntary they do not 
necessarily apply to all those engaged in lobbying the 
Scottish Parliament or Executive. This is a serious 
regulatory blindspot. Again, with no obvious 
mechanisms to effectively police these codes, their value 
as regulatory instruments is questionable.  
3.9 We do not see any benefits to be gained through the 
introduction of a voluntary code of conduct for lobbyists.  
3.10 Voluntary codes are often ineffectual. If lobbyists 
are not compelled to sign up to such codes, and are not 
bound by any independently applied sanction if they 
breach these codes, then their impact can only be 
cosmetic. It is our view that voluntary codes are poor 
substitutes for statutory regulation. The weak and 
ineffectual regulation in Brussels and Westminster are 
testament to that.  
3.11 Although we think only a statutory code will satisfy 
the CSGÕs aspirations for openness if a voluntary code 
were to be introduced it should apply to all those who 
lobby in Scotland, including commercial consultants, in-
house lobbyists in commercial corporations and the 
voluntary sector. The code should make explicit 
provision for the disclosure of the resources devoted to 
lobbying. Furthermore it should apply to the Parliament 
and to the Executive. Any information which is disclosed 
should be made widely available to the public in printed 
form and on the web. It is simply not enough to bury it 
by making disclosure only to SPICe or some other part of 
the Parliamentary apparatus. 
  
References  
Greenwood, J. (1997) Representing Interests in the 
European Union, Basingstoke: Macmillan.  
Leigh, D. and Vulliamy, E. (1997) Sleaze: The 
Corruption of Parliament, London: Fourth Estate.  
Monbiot, G. (1998) 'Dressed for the job', Journalist 
Jul/Aug: 20-21.  
Neill Committee (2000) Reinforcing Standards: Review 
of the First Report of the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life, Volume 1: Report Cm 4557-I, p.86.  
Scottish Executive (1999) An Open Scotland, Edinburgh: 
Scottish Executive. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library2/doc07/opsc-01.htm.  
Silverstein, K. (1998) Washington on $10 Million a Day: 
How lobbyists plunder the nation, Monroe, Maine: 
Common Courage Press.  
Whitehead, B. (1998) 'Why did ITN kill my story?', 
Journalist, Oct/Nov: 14-15.  
 
